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Note
Lien on Me: After Craft, a Federal Tax Lien Can
Attach to Tenancy-by-the-Entirety Property
Colleen M. Feeney
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans expect the federal government to shoulder many
responsibilities and provide them with many opportunities.' In order to
accomplish these tasks, the government needs money, most of which
comes from taxes. 2 Because of the government's responsibilities, it has
incurred a large federal debt, the effect of which has increasingly
burdened the United States.3  The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
collects upon debts owed to the federal government in an effort to
reduce the national debt.4 One method the IRS employs to collect debts
* J.D. expected May 2003. I would like to thank my family and friends for their love,
support, and patience, without which this Note could not have been written. I would also like to
thank the editorial staff of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their comments and
suggestions.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., Taxes and Society, in FAQS: TAXES, at http://www.treas.gov/
education/faq/taxes/taxes-society.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
2. Id. The government collects taxes to provide many services. Id. Other methods for paying
for governmental functions are "the issuance of public debt and the issuance of money." Id.
3. Id. The current projection for the federal debt for the end of the fiscal year 2002 is
$5,854,990 million. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., Gross Federal Debt History, in FACT SHEETS:
TAXES, at http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/fed-debt.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2002).
4. See Seth S. Katz, Comment, Federal Debt Collection Under the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act: The Preemption of State Real Estate Laws, 46 EMORY L.J. 1697, 1698 (1997).
In the 1980s, President Reagan realized the problem of outstanding federal debt and instructed the
government agencies to "institute more effective debt collection practices." H.R. REP. NO. 101-
825 (1990), 1990 WL 200549, at *1-2, quoted in Katz, supra, at 1698. "Allowing uncollected
debt to grow increases the cost of government and adds to the inflation that hurts every one of
us." Statement by the President, "Federal Credit Management," Administration of Ronald
Reagan, Apr. 23, 1981, quoted in Katz, supra, at 1698 n.2 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-825 (1990),
1990 WL 200549, at *1-2).
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owed to the government is through the attachment and enforcement of
federal liens on real property.
5
The general federal tax lien is the most wide-reaching federal lien,
attaching to a delinquent taxpayer's real and personal property and to
any right to property to which the taxpayer is entitled.6 Difficult issues
arise when the IRS is allowed to satisfy tax.debts through jointly owned
property. 7  Although the federal government must protect its fiscal
integrity, the owners of joint property who do not owe past-due taxes
should not have their interests unduly impeded by a delinquent owner's
debts. 8  An example of these competing interests arises when
determining whether a federal tax lien should attach to tenancy-by-the-
entirety property.
9
Over fifty years ago, a United States Court of Appeals compared the
tenancy-by-the-entirety interest to "'the morning fog rising from the
valley,"' holding that when only one of the co-tenants owed taxes, a
federal tax lien would not attach.10 Even with the evolution of the tax
5. Id. at 1698. A "lien" is a legal interest that a creditor has in someone else's property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (7th ed. 1999). A "judgment lien" is "a lien imposed on a
judgment debtor's nonexempt property; such a lien gives the judgment creditor the right to attach
the judgment debtor's property." Id. at 935. For a list of property exempt from a federal tax lien,
see infra note 46.
6. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000) (reaching "all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal").
7. Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests
and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 Mo. L. REv. 839, 839 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Fog, Fairness,
and the Federal Fisc]. In two Supreme Court decisions, the Court held for the IRS, reversing
lower court decisions. Id. at 839 n.l; see United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713
(1985) (holding that the IRS could levy on a joint bank account when only one of the depositors
owed taxes); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983) (holding that the IRS could force the
sale of homestead property when only one of the spouses owed taxes). However, the Court split
5-4 both times, and the majority and dissenting blocks did not fit any particular pattern. Johnson,
Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra, at 839 n. I. For example, Justice Stevens was the
only Justice to dissent in both cases, while Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in
National Bank of Commerce and the dissent in Rodgers. Id.
8. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 839. Johnson further notes
that uncollected shortfalls would inevitably be passed on to the rest of the country's taxpayers.
Id.
9. Id. The definition for "tenancy-by-the-entirety" is: "A joint tenancy that arises between
husband and wife when a single instrument conveys realty to both of them but nothing is said in
the deed or will about the character of their ownership." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (7th
ed. 1999). This type of tenancy exists in only a few common-law states. Id.
10. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 839 (quoting United States
v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951)). The court in United States v. Hutcherson
based its reasoning about the state law limits on the rights of creditors to reach tenancy-by-the-
entirety property. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d at 331; Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc,
supra note 7, at 839-40; see also infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding and analysis of Hutcherson).
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laws, this was the view of an overwhelming majority of courts with
respect to federal tax liens attaching to tenancy-by-the-entirety
property," until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Craft.12
Part II of this Note traces the legislative history of § 632113 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") and how the statute affects tax
collection procedures by the IRS.14 Part II then traces the development
of tenancy-by-the-entirety property in the United States. 15  Part II also
considers the approaches taken by the Michigan courts that have
examined tenancy-by-the-entirety property in conjunction with the
attachment of a federal tax lien. 16 Part II then reviews the decisions of
the courts of appeals relating to the issue of whether a federal tax lien
could attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 1  Part I
concludes with an examination of the Supreme Court's analysis of the
role of state law in federal tax analysis before and after United States v.
Drye.18  Part III of this Note reviews the state court decision, the
appellate decision, and the majority and dissenting opinions of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Craft. 19 Part
IV discusses why the majority was correct in its analysis. Finally,
Part V concludes with a discussion about the impact this decision will
11. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 840.
12. United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1426 (2002); see also infra Part III.A (discussing
the facts of United States v. Craft); infra Part I1I.B (discussing the district court's decision); infra
Part III.C (discussing the Sixth Circuit's decision); infra Part HID (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis).
13. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000).
14. See infra Parts H.A-B (discussing the legislative history of § 6321 of the Code and the tax
collection procedures of the IRS).
15. See infra Part II.C (discussing the development of tenancy-by-the-entirety property from
its origins within English feudalism to its present form within the United States).
16. See infra Part H.D. I (analyzing the Sixth Circuit opinions in Fischre v. United States, 852
F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Mich. 1994), United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cit. 1990),
and Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cit. 1971)). This Note focuses on Sixth Circuit
opinions because the Sixth Circuit decided Craft v. United States.
17. See infra Part II.D.2 (analyzing how the appellate courts approached the issue of whether a
federal tax lien would attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety before United States v.
Craft).
18. See infra Parts H.D.3-4 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Drye v. United States,
528 U.S. 49 (1999), United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994), United States v. National Bank
of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985), United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983), Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), and United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958)).
19. See infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of United States v. Craft); infra Part III.B
(discussing the district court's decision); infra Part IlI.C (discussing the Sixth Circuit's decision);
infra Part HI.D (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis).
20. See infra Part IV (analyzing the Court's decision in Craft).
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have on the creation of tenancy-by-the-entirety property across the
United States.
21
II. BACKGROUND
It is important to explore the history of § 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code and tenancy-by-the-entirety property in the United States
to understand the United States v. Craft decision because Congress
failed to explicitly answer the question of whether a federal tax lien
would attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 22  First, this
Part examines the legislative history of § 6321 of the Code23 and
explains how the IRS collects delinquent taxes. 24  It then describes the
development of tenancy-by-the-entirety as a form of property ownership
in the United States. 25 This Part concludes with an examination of case
law interpreting the Supreme Court's analysis regarding tenancy-by-the-
entirety property and federal tax liens leading up to United States v.
Craft.26
A. Legislative History of§ 6321
Congress rewrote the revenue code in 1954, replacing the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.27 Consequently, many sections of the Code
28
were revised. As part of this overhaul, the House of Representatives
passed a measure that expressly stated that a federal tax lien would
attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 29  The measure did
not pass in the Senate.3
0
21. See infra Part V (discussing the positive implications resulting from the Court's decision).
22. See infra Parts II.A-D (examining the history and background of § 6321 of the Code and
tenancy-by-the-entirety property).
23. See infra Part I.A (setting forth the legislative history of § 6321 of the Code).
24. See infra Part II.B (discussing the procedure used by the IRS to collect taxes from
delinquent taxpayers).
25. See infra Part II.C (discussing the origins of the tenancy-by-the-entirety form of property
ownership and its status before United States v. Craft).
26. See infra Part IH.D (analyzing lower court decisions regarding whether a federal tax lien
can attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety).
27. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to
Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163, 1185 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, After
Drye] (discussing the legislative history of § 6321).
28. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1185.
29. H.R. REP. No. 83-1377, at 4132 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4554
("This section clarifies the term 'property and rights to property' by expressly including therein
the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the entirety."); see also Johnson, After Drye,
supra note 27, at 1185 (discussing the legislative history of § 6321).
30. S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 4776 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5224. The
Senate responded by stating:
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B. Tax Collection: A Summary
Since the government can only attach a lien on property to the extent
of the debtor's interest in the property, it is critical to determine the
debtor's interest in the property to ascertain the entire reach of the
federal tax lien.31 The United States Constitution gives the federal
government the power to collect taxes. 32  In fact, the federal
government primarily derives its revenue from the collection of taxes,
which ultimately depends on the successful collection efforts of the
IRS.33 In general, the IRS can only enforce collection against properties
to which a federal tax lien can attach. 34  Thus, it is important to
determine the debtor's interest in the property.
35
When the government wants to collect delinquent taxes, the claim
upon the delinquent taxpayer is similar to the claim of a creditor seeking
payment of a debt. 36 In contrast to a private creditor, however, the IRS
is given statutory power to generate a lien.37  First, the IRS must
properly assess the taxpayer's liability. 38  Then, the IRS must send a
notice of demand to the delinquent taxpayer.39 After the issuance of the
demand notice and the later non-payment of the taxes, the federal tax
This section corresponds to that of the House bill, except that the parenthetical phrase
"(including the interest of such person as tenant by the entirety)", which phrase is not
included in existing law, has been deleted. It is not clear what change in existing law
would be made by the parenthetical phrase. The deletion of the phrase is intended to
continue the existing law.
Id.; see also Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1185 (discussing the legislative history of §
6321).
31. See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1983) (noting that § 6321 can only
reach property interests held by the debtor taxpayer); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 1711-12
("[T]he federal government's interest in the debtor's property is only as great as the taxpayer's
interest .... ); Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 840-41 (proposing
that a federal tax lien under § 6321 should attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety-property).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Furthermore, the Sixteenth Amendment gives the power to
collect income taxes. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
33. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1170. "Taxes are the lifeblood of the government,
and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,
259 (1935).
34. Id.
35. Katz, supra note 4, at 1712.
36. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1170-71.
37. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000). Section 6321 of the Code states that "if any person liable to pay any
tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount... shall be, a lien in favor of the
United States. ." Id.
38. See id. §§ 6203, 6303.
39. Id. § 6303. An assessment without a demand will not give rise to a lien. See id. § 6303;
I.R.C. § 6201 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
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lien arises.40 Thereafter, the amount of tax liability assessed results in
the creation of a lien attaching to "all property and rights to property"
4 1
belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. 42  The phrase "all property and
rights to property" has been construed broadly, reaching almost
anything of value belonging to the delinquent taxpayer.
43
There are two principal ways in which a federal tax lien can be
enforced: the administrative levy 44 and the judicial foreclosure. 45 These
collection techniques can only be applied to property to which a federal
46tax lien has attached. When identifying the property to which a lien
40. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6322 (2000). The lien will still be attached until the tax is paid or until the
statute of limitations has run. Id. § 6322.
41. The term "property" is defined as "the right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate
thing... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999).
42. I.R.C. § 6321. Section 6321 of the Code is a general tax lien; it is considered the only
"comprehensive" lien in the Internal Revenue Code. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1170.
43. United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1985) (noting that the
language of § 6321 "is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in
property that a taxpayer might have"); see also Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265,
267 (1945) ("Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the
collection of taxes."). Thus, even though state law serves as the basis for determining the rights
given to a property interest, the description has been interpreted to be nearly all encompassing.
Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1167.
44. I.R.C. § 6331(b). Section 6331(b) of the Code defines "levy" as including "the power of
distraint and seizure by any means." Id. The IRS sells the seized property. Id. While there are
exemptions provided, the items excluded are enumerated and thus limited. See infra note 46
(listing the exemptions provided by the Code).
45. I.R.C. § 7403. If the government wishes to sell the property to enforce its lien, the court
may deny foreclosure. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983). The court exercises
the standard of "reasoned discretion." Id. If the court authorizes a sale, the government must
compensate the non-liable spouse for her interest "according to the findings of the court in respect
to the interests of the parties and of the United States." Id. at 697-98 (quoting I.R.C. § 7403).
46. See Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 690-91 (noting that § 6321 can only reach property interests held
by the debtor taxpayer); see also Katz, supra note 4, at 1711 (discussing the requirements for a
valid enforceable lien). The Code lists several specific categories of property that are exempt
from an administrative levy. Section 6334(a) of the Code provides exemptions for:
(1) Wearing apparel and school books
(2) Fuel, provisions, furniture, and personal effects
(3) Books and tools of a trade, business, or profession
(4) Unemployment benefits
(5) Undelivered mail
(6) Certain annuity and pension payments
(7) Workmen's compensation
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will attach, the IRS will first target property in which the delinquent
taxpayer is the fee simple owner.47 Often, however, these assets have
been used up or are not available.48  Thus, the IRS may go after
property that is held in less than fee simple ownership.49  Because the
government can only attach a lien on property to the extent of the
debtor's interest, it is necessary to ascertain the debtor's interest in the
property to determine the reach of the federal tax lien. 50
C. Tenancy-by-the-Entirety
To understand how property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety could be
attached by a federal tax lien, it is important to understand how this
property right developed in the United States and what rights tenancy-
by-the-entirety owners have in the property. 5' Furthermore, the impact
Craft will have on tenancy-by-the-entirety property can be seen through
an examination of the different approaches that the states have taken
with respect to tenancy-by-the-entirety property.
52
(8) Judgments for support of minor children
(9) Minimum exemption for wages, salary, and other income
(10) Certain service-connected disability payments
(11) Certain public assistance payments
(12) Assistance under Job Training Partnership Act [and]
(13) Residences exempt in small deficiency cases and principle residences and certain
business assets exempt in absence of certain approval or jeopardy[.]
I.R.C. § 6334(a).
47. Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in the Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 5
FLA. TAX REV. 415, 417 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly]. A
federal tax lien will attach to fee simple ownership first because it is "obviously" the property of
the tax delinquent and because this property is "relatively easy to convert into cash to pay the
liability." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. "Fee simple" ownership is "an interest in land that, being the broadest property
interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs; esp., a fee simple
absolute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (7th ed. 1999).
50. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 842.
51. See infra Part H.C. 1 (discussing the origins of tenancy-by-the-entirety).
52. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the varied approaches taken by the jurisdictions toward
tenancy-by-the-entirety estates).
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1. Origins of Tenancy-by-the-Entirety
There are various forms of concurrent ownership 53 in American
property law, many of which are almost six hundred years old.54
Although the origin of tenancy-by-the-entirety is not known, Littleton
and Blackstone recognized it as far back as the fifteenth century.55
Tenancy-by-the-entirety is thought to have originated in England's
feudal society.5 6 At common-law, a married couple could hold property
in tenancy-by-the-entirety 57 because they were treated as a single
person. 5 8  Unlike other forms of concurrent ownership, there was an
additional unity59 required for the concurrent ownership of tenancy-by-
53. There are multiple forms of concurrent ownership, "including community property,
tenancies in common, joint tenancies, and tenancies by the entireties." Johnson, After Drye,
supra note 27, at 1169. Concurrent ownership occurs when two or more people own or possess
property at the same time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 286, 1131 (7th ed. 1999).
54. Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Ownership
for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 423 (2001).
55. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01 [2], at 52-3 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., Mathew Bender & Co. 2001) (1949). See POWELL for a comprehensive list of case
names and statutes for each state's treatment of tenancy-by-the-entirety. 7 id.
56. Janet D. Ritsko, Comment, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the Entirety After
Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 85, 91 (1995). At the time, land
equaled power and status, and the king owned every piece of land in England. Id. at 90. The
king would award tracts of land to his loyal servants, who then became known as lords. Id. In
fact, King William of Normandy distributed about seventy-five percent of his land in England to
his supporters. Id. at 90 & n.39. The king would maintain ownership, while allowing the lords to
work the land. Id. at 90. The lords then acquired their own tenants. Id. This system trickled
down and included even the lowest members of society. Id. The tenants would compensate their
overlords through services. Id. at 91. This system continued until 1290 when the Statute Quia
Emptores was passed. Id. at 90 n.44. This statute did not allow a tenant to grant smaller estates
from estates held by the lord in fee simple. Id. Later, free substitution was allowed, where the
tenant had the right to put another tenant in his place. Id. As feudalism waned, tenants would
pay fixed amounts of money, like rent, instead of the personal services that were once required of
them. Id. at 91.
57. The first modern pronouncement of a tenancy-by-the-entirety is in William Blackstone's
Commentaries. Carrozzo, supra note 54, at 437. Blackstone describes the tenancy-by-the-
entirety as a separate and distinct form of ownership in his Commentaries:
And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither
properly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife being considered
as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seised of the
entirety, per tout et non per my; the consequence of which is that neither the husband
nor wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must
remain to the survivor.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 182 (9th ed. 1783),
quoted in Carrozzo, supra note 54, at 437.
58. Carrozzo, supra note 54, at 429. Upon marriage, both the husband and the wife were
deemed to lose their individual identities and became a single entity. Johnson, After Drye, supra
note 27, at 1169.
59. At common-law, it was necessary to have four "unities" to create a joint tenancy.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (7th ed. 1999). The four "unities" are interest, possession,
2002] Lien on Me
the-entirety property: the unity of the person.60  This form of property
ownership was not thought of as a concurrent estate because both
husband and wife were considered to be one person by the law.
61
The common-law established the notion, which still exists, that
neither spouse could unilaterally alienate or encumber the property
because the property was indivisible and neither spouse had an
individual share. 62 Thus, creditors could not attach property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety to satisfy the individual debts of a spouse.
63
Additionally, owners of property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety
received a right of survivorship: "'the whole must remain to the
survivor." '64 Under common-law, however, the courts only recognized
present property rights in the husband, such as the right to use, the right
to rent, and the right to profits.
65
The American colonies and, later, many states adopted tenancy-by-
the-entirety as a form of concurrent ownership of property. 66  The
inequities created 67 through holding land in tenancy-by-the-entirety,
however, would only last so long. 68 In 1925, England abolished
tenancy-by-the-entirety. 69  Then, in the middle of the nineteenth
century, the enactment of married women's property reform legislation,
beginning with the Married Women's Property Acts, further
undermined this already unstable form of property ownership. These
time, and title. Id. The "unity of interest" required that all of the joint tenants' interests be
"identical in nature, extent, and duration." Id. The "unity of possession" required that each joint
tenant be entitled to possess the whole property. Id. The "unity of time" required each of the
joint tenants' interests "vest at the same time." Id. The "unity of title" required that each joint
tenant "acquire[d] their interests under the same instrument." Id.
60. Carrozzo, supra note 54, at 429. "This oneness of person made true concurrent ownership
by husband and wife a legal, albeit fictitious, impossibility." id. at 436.
61. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital
Estate, 1997 BYU L. REv. 35, 38-39; see also supra note 53 (discussing alternate forms of
concurrent ownership).
62. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 842.
63. Id.
64. Orth, supra note 61, at 39 (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at 179, 182).
65. Id. at 40. "'[A]t common law, husband and wife were one, and that one was the
husband."' Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1169 n. 36 (citing Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by
Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951)).
66. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 843.
67. The husband had the exclusive rights to occupy the principle, use the income produced by
the estate, manage, control, possess the estate, and use the estate as collateral for debt. See
Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1169. In contrast, the wife's sole interest was a contingent
right of survivorship to the whole estate if she were to outlive her husband. Id.
68. Orth, supra note 61, at 41.
69. Id. (citing Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 37 (Eng.)).
70. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 843. The Married
Women's Property Acts "caused some western states never to adopt the tenancy-by-the-entireties
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reforms caused the tenancy-by-the-entirety form of property ownership
to be abolished in some American jurisdictions as well.71 The courts
that abolished the interest took the position that since married women
could have rights to property, the husband and wife were no longer one
person. 72 Thus, there could be no tenancy-by-the-entirety.
73
2. Status of Tenancy-by-the-Entirety Property Before Craft
Despite the trend to abolish tenancy-by-the-entirety property, it
remained in many jurisdictions. 74  However, courts have taken varied
approaches toward tenancy-by-the-entirety estates. 75  Currently, thirty
states and the District of Columbia allow tenancy-by-the-entirety as a
legitimate form of ownership. 76 Four states have statutes that mention
tenancy-by-the-entirety in their codes, but their statutes do not govern or
restrict the ability to hold property as tenants-by-the-entirety. 77 Sixteen
form and caused some other states to abolish or restrict it." Id. The Married Women's Property
Acts were statutes enacted by many states by the 1840s. Reva B. Seigel, Home as Work: The
First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073, 1082 (1994). The Married Women's Property Acts were spurred by the argument that
women should be able to separately own the property that they brought to their marriages or
acquired during their marriages. Id. at 1115. Some of the states enacted statutes that exempted a
wife's property from her husband's debts. Id. at 1082. These statutes served to protect family
interests, keeping family property from the husband's creditors. Id. at 1083. "At the same time,
the reform legislation opened vistas beyond the ancient status doctrines of the common law,
suggesting that the traditional consolidation of property interests in the husband might be
supplanted by a regime of separate property ownership in marriage." Id. at 1083.
71. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 843; see also infra note 78
(discussing the jurisdictions that never recognized a tenancy-by-the-entirety interest or abolished
it).
72. Orth, supra note 61, at 41.
73. Id.
74. See 7 POWELL, supra note 55, § 52.01[3], at 52-4.
75. 7 id.
76. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-12. References to tenancy-by-the-entirety specifically appear in the
statutes of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Wyoming. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-4 to 52-11. In the following states, courts have
recognized tenancy-by-the-entirety: Mississippi, Vermont, and Virginia. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-9
to 52-11.
77. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-12. These states are Idaho, Kansas, Texas, and Utah. 7 id. §
52.01[3], at 52-12 n.99. The only statutory or case-law authority is based upon uniform acts that
have accepted the legitimacy of the tenancy-by-the-entirety form. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-12.
There are a number of code provisions in Idaho that recognize the existence of tenancy-by-the-
entirety property. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-6. Even though in 1902, the Kansas Supreme Court
abolished tenancy-by-the-entirety in Stewart v. Thomas, a number of current statutes in Kansas
mention tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-7 (referencing Stewart v.
Thomas, 68 P. 70 (Kan. 1902)). In Texas, some statutes dealing with fraudulent transfers, non-
profit corporations, and partnerships mention tenancy-by-the-entirety property, but no statutes or
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states either never recognized tenancy-by-the-entirety or have abolished
it.78 The jurisdictions that did keep the tenancy-by-the-entirety form of
ownership can be divided into at least two groups based on their
treatment of the rights of creditors to attach liens to the property.79 For
court opinions expressly create tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 7 id. Similarly, Utah has
statutes mentioning tenancy-by-the-entirety when determining interests upon death, partnerships,
and fraud. 7 id.
78. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-11 to 52-12. The following are the states where tenancy-by-the-
entirety has been abolished or never existed: California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-5 to
52-11. In California, there are no statutes that mention tenancy-by-the-entirety, and it has been
judicially abolished. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-5. In Connecticut, tenancy-by-the-entirety is deemed
to be joint tenancy-with a right of survivorship. 7 id. In Louisiana, there are no state statutes or
cases referencing tenancy-by-the-entirety. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-7. Tenancy-by-the-entirety is
not recognized in Maine courts. 7 id. Minnesota courts have held that a statute on concurrent
estates, which omits reference to tenancy-by-the-entirety, has abolished the tenancy. 7 id. §
52.01[3], at 52-8. Montana's concurrent ownership statute does not reference tenancy-by-the-
entirety and the Supreme Court of Montana has held that tenancy-by-the-entirety is "'not a
permissible mode of ownership of property in Montana."' 7 id. (quoting Clark v. Clark, 387 P.2d
907 (Mont. 1963)). The Nevada Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, but Nevada has a
statute that states that a husband and a wife may only hold property as joint tenants, tenants in
common, or as community property. 7 id. The New Hampshire courts have held that the state's
married women's property rights act has abolished tenancy-by-the-entirety property created after
the act was passed. 7 id. In New Mexico, there is a statute that authorizes a husband and a wife
to hold property jointly, but it does not mention tenancy-by-the-entirety. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at 52-8
to 52-9. Furthermore, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that when New Mexico became a
community property state, tenancy-by-the-entirety property was abrogated. 7 id. § 52.01[3], at
52-8 to 52-9. In North Dakota, there is no mention of tenancy-by-the-entirety in its statutory
definition of concurrent ownership of property. 7 id. § 52.01 [3], at 52-9. In addition, one court in
North Dakota has declared that tenancy-by-the-entirety is not recognized. 7 id. In Ohio, before
1972, property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety was not recognized. 7 id. However, the code was
amended in 1972 to specifically recognize it. 7 id. However, when the code was amended again
in 1985, tenancy-by-the-entirety was replaced by a generic survivorship tenancy. 7 id. Any
tenancy-by-the-entirety created under the previous statute would still remain valid. 7 id. The
South Carolina Supreme Court abolished tenancy-by-the-entirety in 1953. 7 id. § 52.01 [3], at 52-
10. Additionally, the South Carolina Senate, when it recently addressed the issue of joint
tenancy, specifically stated that it was not creating tenancy-by-the-entirety, implying that the
tenancy-by-the-entirety did not exist in South Carolina. 7 id. In South Dakota, a 1973 case
declared that tenancy-by-the-entirety was not a form of property under South Dakota law, and
there is no mention of tenancy-by-the-entirety property in the statute authorizing forms of
concurrent ownership. 7 id. The Washington Supreme Court noted that "[Tienancy by the
entireties is superseded by the community property system." Holophan v. Melville, 249 P.2d 777
(Wash. 1959), quoted in 7 POWELL, supra note 55, § 52.01[3], at 52-11. Furthermore, there is no
mention of tenancy-by-the-entirety property under the statute authorizing joint tenancies.
7 POWELL, supra note 55, § 52.01[3], at 52-11. The Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished
tenancy-by-the-entirety in 1938. 7 id. However, Wisconsin statutes regarding partnerships and
fraudulent transfers, mention tenancy-by-the-entirety. 7 id.
79. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1169. Johnson divides the jurisdictions that
recognize tenancy-by-the-entirety interests into two separate groups: (1) the jurisdictions that do
not allow creditors to attach a lien to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety for the debts of one
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
instance, the advent of the modem tenancy-by-the-entirety interest and
of mutual control of the property prompted protection of both spouses'
interests; some states denied creditors access to either spouse's
interest.80 In other states, however, a creditor was allowed to attach a
levy and sale to a spouse's individual interest, but there was no right to
force a partition of the land.8 1 A minority of states allowed creditors of
either spouse to satisfy debts from tenancy-by-the-entirety property.
82
Finally, in some states, a valid lien could not attach to tenancy-by-the-
entirety property to satisfy the individual debts of one of the spouses.
83
D. Case Law Before Craft
This Part analyzes the case law regarding the scope of federal tax
liens and tenancy-by-the-entirety property. First, this Part will examine
Michigan decisions interpreting the Supreme Court's analysis of
tenancy-by-the-entirety ownership and federal tax liens in order to
84
understand the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Craft. Next, this Part will
analyze the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals to show
the basis for the argument that a federal tax lien should not attach to
tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 85  This Part will then examine the
Supreme Court's analysis of the role of state law in federal tax analysis,
showing why there was confusion among the lower courts.86  Finally,
this Part will present the current state of the law regarding the role of
state law in federal tax analysis through an examination of the Supreme
Court's decision in Drye v. United States.
87
spouse; and (2) the jurisdictions that allow creditors to attach tenancy-by-the-entirety property
with a lien for the debts of one spouse, but only subject to the rights of the non-debtor spouse. Id.
80. 7 POWELL, supra note 55, § 52.03[3], at 52-22. The following states deny creditor access
to the property when only one spouse owes the debt: Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland,
Missouri, Ohio, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia. 7 id. § 52.03[3], at 52-22 & n.7, 52-23.
81. 7 id. § 52.03[3], at 52-23. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 7 id. § 52.03[3], at 52-23 & n.8.
82. 7 id. In Oklahoma and Tennessee, creditors can satisfy the debts of one spouse with the
tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 7 id. § 52.03[3], at 52-23 & n.10.
83. 7 id. § 52.03[3], at 52-24.
84. See infra Part I.D.1 (analyzing the Michigan decisions interpreting the Supreme Court's
analysis regarding the scope of a federal tax lien).
85. See infra Part II.D.2 (analyzing how the appellate courts approached the issue of whether a
federal tax lien would attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety before United States v.
Craft).
86. See infra Part II.D.3 (discussing the Supreme Court's analyses in United States v. Bess,
United States v. Rodgers, Aquilino v. United States, United States v. National Bank of Commerce,
and United States v. Irvine).
87. See infra Part II.D.4 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Drye v. United States).
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1. Michigan Decisions Interpreting the Supreme Court's Analysis
Regarding Tenancy-by-the-Entirety and Federal Tax Liens
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cole v. Cardoza88 held that a
federal tax lien against only one spouse does not attach to property
owned by a husband and wife in tenancy-by-the-entirety property
because it constituted a cloud on their title. 89 In Cole, excise taxes were
assessed against the husband, Eugene Cole, in connection with
gambling debts. 9° The government placed a lien on the home owned by
Eugene Cole and his wife as tenants-by-the-entirety. 9 1  The Sixth
Circuit applied Michigan law to determine that tenants-by-the-entirety
hold property under a single title.92  Therefore, neither spouse alone
could alienate their property, and neither the land nor any rents or
profits from the land could be subject to a levy or an execution by
creditors to satisfy the debts of only the husband or the wife.93 The
court reasoned that the lien constituted a cloud on their title to the
property.94 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held the lien null and void because
the lien was only against one spouse.
95
The protection for property in Michigan held in tenancy-by-the-
entirety applied to all creditors until the decision in United States v.
2525 Leroy Lane9 6 by the Sixth Circuit.97  In 2525 Leroy Lane, the
Sixth Circuit allowed the government to take half of the innocent
owner's proceeds from a sale of the tenancy-by-the-entirety property
because once the tenancy-by-the-entirety estate was terminated, the wife
88. Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971).
89. Id. at 1343-44.
90. Id. at 1338. The government assessed an excise tax in the amount of $14,693.08 on the
amount Mr. Cole gambled during the period of August 1, 1965 to November 20, 1965. Id.
Furthermore, in August 1969, tax assessments for the interest were recorded at $2086.19. Id. at
1339. The taxes were assessed pursuant to § 4401 and § 4411 of the Code. Id. at 1338.
91. Id. at 1343. Interestingly, the court noted that under Michigan law, the Government had
no valid claim against the property. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Farrell v. Paulus, 15 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich. 1944)).
94. Id. "[I]f it 'has a tendency, even in the slightest degree, to cast doubt upon the owner's
title, and to stand in the way of a full and free exercise of ownership,' it should be removed." Id.
(quoting Whitney v. Port Huron, 50 N.W. 316, 317-18 (Mich. 1891)). The court reasoned that
the lien on the Coles' home would make the "average prospective purchaser or mortgagee
hesitant to purchase or mortgage the property until [the] matter [was] cleared up . I..." d.
95. Id. "[Iln the present situation, the federal tax lien does not attach to the subject property
owned by Eugene and Mary Cole by the entirety, because the Government's tax lien is against
Eugeen Cole only." Id.
96. United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990).
97. Eric T. Weiss, Tax Liens, Entireties Property, Cole v. Cardoza Revisited, 74 MICH. B.J.
1040, 1041 (1995).
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was only entitled to half of the proceeds. 98  The wife owned a house
with her husband, a convicted drug dealer, as tenants-by-the-entirety.
99
The United States seized the house under a criminal-forfeiture statute
because of her husband's conviction. 1° ° In order to determine the
wife's interest, the court applied Michigan law governing tenancy-by-
the-entirety property. 0 1 The court noted that, in ascertaining whether a
federal tax lien could attach to a particular property, federal courts
typically apply state law to determine the property interest of the
owners. 10 2 The court applied this analysis because, like the forfeiture
statutes, the tax lien statute does not define property rights. 10 3  The
court therefore looked to Michigan property law and determined that
tenants-by-the-entirety hold property under a single title of ownership
with the right of survivorship. 104 Neither spouse had the power to
unilaterally alienate any interest in the estate, nor could creditors of only
one spouse levy against the property.
10 5
Applying Michigan law in 2525 Leroy Lane, the Sixth Circuit noted
that the wife, the non-debtor spouse, would have only realized her
survivorship interest if she survived her husband.l°6 The court reasoned
that if the marriage terminated in divorce, the tenancy-by-the-entirety
property would be converted into a tenancy-in-common property by
operation of statute, with each spouse holding half of the property
interest.107  Thus, the property could then be attached to satisfy the
personal tax liability of a single spouse. 10 8 Additionally, the court noted
98. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 352; cf United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d
1511, 1516 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1990) (stating that no lien could presently attach but the government
could file lis pendens) and United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 1991)
(remanding under instructions similar to those found in the 2525 Leroy Lane court's decision).
99. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 344-45.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 347-48 (noting Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971)). "[T]he
application of state law is the most appropriate method of determining the interest of an innocent
owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)." Id. at 347.
102. Id. at 347-48. "[Sltate laws governing tenancies by the entirety have been applied by
federal courts in determining the interests available for the satisfaction of a federal tax lien, where
the tax lien statute, like the forfeiture statutes, contained no definition of property rights." Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 346. The "right of survivorship" is a right held by a joint tenant "to succeed to the.
whole estate upon the death of the other joint tenant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (7th ed.
1999). In other words, the surviving tenant has the right to take the entire piece of property. Id.
105. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 346.
106. Id. at 351.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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that the tenancy-by-the-entirety estate could also be destroyed through a
joint conveyance of the property by the husband and wife. 10 9
The Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding, which awarded
all of the proceeds from the forced sale of the property to the wife, as
the innocent owner, on the grounds that she would only be entitled to all
of the proceeds on the sale of the property after the death of her
husband. 110 Conversely, she would be entitled to only half of the
proceeds upon the termination of the tenancy-by-the-entirety estate.II
In Fischre v. United States,l l2 the District Court of Western
Michigan held that the government's lien attached to a spouse's
individual interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property and could remain
on their title with the Register of Deeds. 113 This case relied on the Sixth
Circuit's decisions in 2525 Leroy Lane and Cole v. Cardoza, involving
tenancy-by-the-entirety properties, and was later followed by the district
court decision in Craft v. United States. 114
In Fischre, Dr. and Mrs. Fischre brought an action to quiet title on
their property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety, on which there was a
judgment lien against only Dr. Fischre. 115 The court held that the lien
could attach to the husband's survivorship interest in the tenancy-by-
the-entirety property, but determined that the lien could not attach to the
present interest in the tenancy-by-the-entirety property for the debts of
only Dr. Fischre because it would encumber the property. 16 The court
in Fischre found that the government's lien clearly showed Dr. Fischre
as the sole judgment debtor and gave no evidence of joint liability. 117
Furthermore, the court, relying on 2525 Leroy Lane, noted that the
judgment lien might still attach to Dr. Fischre's individual interest, even
though the lien was a nullity as to the present interest the Fischres had
in the property. 118
109. Id. In this case, the wife would not agree to a joint conveyance. Id.
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id.
112. Fischre v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
113. Id. at630.
114. Id. at 629-30; see also Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680 (W.D.
Mich., Sept. 12, 1994), rev'd, 140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002)
[hereinafter Craft I]; supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit's
decision in 2525 Leroy Lane); infra Part III (discussing Craft v. United States).
115. Fischre, 852 F. Supp. at 628-29.
116. Id. at 630.
117. Id. at 629 ("[T]he United States' judgment lien is not ambiguous; it clearly identifies Dr.
Fischre only as the judgment debtor and gives no indication of joint liability.").
118. Id. at 630. The court noted that each spouse owned the individual interest of a life estate
with a right of survivorship. Id. (citing United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 350-51
2002]
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The Sixth Circuit had previously decided this issue in Cole v.
Cardoza.119 Based on a factual situation similar to that in Fischre, the
Sixth Circuit in Cole held that a tax lien could not attach to the
husband's interest in property held as tenants-by-the-entirety. 120 The
court recognized that a federal tax lien on the public land records
pertaining to Cole's property constituted a cloud on the title, making a
prospective purchaser or mortgagee reluctant to commit himself or
herself until the tax lien was removed.
121
Even though the Fischre court found that there were individual
interests in the property, the Fischre court followed the decision in Cole
holding that the judgment lien was a nullity because it constituted a
"cloud on the title." 122 It is important to note, however, that the Fischre
court found an "individual interest" in tenancy-by-the-entirety
property. 123 This decision opposes the most basic element of tenancy-
by-the-entirety property: that spouses hold the property together, as one,
with a right of survivorship, and that neither of them can unilaterally
alienate any interest in the property.1
2 4
2. Federal Tax Lien and Tenancy-by-the-Entirety: Courts of Appeals
Analyses
Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Craft, a federal
tax lien could only attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety property if the state
(6th Cir. 1990)). This individual fight is not realized until the tenancy-by-the-entirety is broken
by the joint conveyance or the death of one spouse. Id. However, the survivorship interest is a
right to property to which a federal tax lien can attach. Id.
119. Id. at 629; see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and
analysis of Cole v. Cardoza).
120. Fischre, 852 F. Supp. at 629 (discussing Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir.
1971)); see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and analysis of Cole).
121. Fischre, 852 F. Supp. at 629. The Sixth Circuit stated:
Michigan law recognizes that a cloud upon a title can be merely an apparent defect and
that if it "has a tendency, even in the slightest degree, to cast doubt upon the owner's
title, and to stand in the way of a full and free exercise of his ownership," it should be
removed.
Cole, 441 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Whitney v. Port Huron, 50 N.W. 316, 317-18 (Mich. 1891)).
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted:
A title examination would not disclose whether an assessment was for a deficiency
with regard to a joint income tax return filed by husband and wife or was levied
because both were engaged in the activity being taxed. Such doubt would affect the
title of the property and cause reasonable prudent purchasers to refuse to accept it until
they were certain the title was clear.
Id. at 1343-44.
122. Fischre, 852 F. Supp. at 630.
123. Weiss, supra note 97, at 1041.
124. Id.
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in which the property was held allowed creditors of a single spouse to
reach the property. 125  The view in the states that prevented the IRS
from attaching a federal tax lien to property held in tenancy-by-the-
entirety when only one of the spouses owed federal taxes was based on
three federal appellate court cases decided in the 1950s: 126 United States
127 Grager 12 8v. Hutcherson, Raffaele v. Granger, and United States v. American
National Bank of Jacksonville.1 29
a. United States v. Hutcherson
In 1951, the Eighth Circuit, in Hutcherson, held that a federal tax lien
did not attach to property held by both spouses as tenants-by-the-
entirety when only one spouse owed a debt. 130  The court recognized
that the property rights were to be determined in accordance with state
law, and then federal law would determine the application of the federal
tax lien to whatever "property" or "rights to property" a delinquent
taxpayer might have under state law. 131  The court noted that, in a
tenancy-by-the-entirety estate, the husband and the wife each own the
whole interest, not a part, of the property. 132  The court reasoned that
the state law prevented the creditors of one debtor spouse from
attaching a lien on tenancy-by-the-entirety property to satisfy the
individual debt of one spouse. 133  The court concluded, however, by
stating that a spouse who holds property in tenancy-by-the-entirety does
not have a "right to property" or "property" at all. 134
125. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 844 (commenting that a
federal tax lien was "hostage to whatever entireties regime exist[ed] in the taxpayer's state"); see
also supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing whether individual states allow
creditors to reach tenancy-by-the-entirety property for the individual debts of one spouse).
126. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 844.
127. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951).
128. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).
129. United States v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1958).
130. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d at 331.
131. Id. at 328 (citing Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945); Detroit Bank v.
United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); and Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943)).
132. Id. at 329.
133. Id. at 330. The court noted that Missouri law "is applied by the state courts [to
determine] whether liens arising under state law may attach to the individual interest of either
spouse." Id. at 331.
134. Id.
Under Missouri law the individual interest of the husband or wife in an estate by the
entirety is, like the rainbow in the sky or the morning fog rising from the valley, not
such an estate as may be subjected to the grasp of an attaching creditor or which will
permit the adherence thereto of a tax lien.
Id. The court then concluded that "[u]niformly it is held that such liens may not. Not because
State or Federal liens are withheld from this particular 'right to property', but because the interest
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
b. Raffaele v. Granger
The very next year, in Raffaele, the Third Circuit held that the IRS
could not issue a warrant of distraint 135 against bank accounts held by a
husband and wife as tenants-by-the-entirety. 136  Even though each
spouse had independent authority to withdraw funds from the account,
the court denied the warrant of distraint, stating that the United States
had no power to take property from an innocent spouse to satisfy the
obligations of the other.137
c. United States v. American National Bank of Jacksonville
In 1958, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in American National
Bank of Jacksonville, held that a federal tax lien could not attach to
tenancy-by-the-entirety property for the debts of only one spouse.
138
The court concluded that there was no separate interest in the tenancy-
by-the-entirety property to which a lien for federal taxes owed by only
one spouse could attach. 139 The court accepted that federal tax liens are
matters of federal law. 140  However, it noted that the federal courts
would respect that state law determined the ownership of property.
14 1
After this line of cases, the prevailing view of the courts in the states
where laws prohibited the attachment of federal tax liens to tenancy-by-
the-entirety property was that such property was immune from the
attachment of federal tax liens where only one of the spouses was
delinquent. 142  Subsequent decisions did not change the analysis of
whether a federal tax lien could attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety
property, 143 until Craft.
of one spouse in the estate by the entirety in Missouri is not a right to property or property in any
sense." Id.
135. A warrant of distraint permits seizure of property in order to secure the payment of
unpaid debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 487 (7th ed. 1999).
136. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1952).
137. Id. at 623. The court noted that any attempt to dispose the interest of one of the spouses
would impair the other spouse's interest of the entire piece of property. Id. at 622. Thus it would
be worthless. Id. The court further noted that "it does not matter that a claim against one spouse
is being asserted under a federal statute for taxes owed the United States." Id. at 623.
138. United States v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1958)
(concurring with the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th
Cir. 1951)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 506.
141. Id. at 506-07.
142. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 846.
143. Id.
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3. The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Analysis Before Drye v.
United States: Supreme Court Analysis
Prior to Drye v. United States,144 the Supreme Court's analysis of the
role of state law in federal tax analysis had been less than crystal clear,
showing why there was confusion among the lower courts as to how to
analyze the issue. 145  Even though the Court had decided this issue
similarly in several cases, the language the Court used did not provide a
definitive test. 
146
In United States v. Bess,14 7 the Supreme Court held that while state
law determined the interests that a taxpayer had in the property, the
courts were to look to federal law to determine whether those interests
were indeed property. 148 In Bess, the Court held that the cash surrender
value of an insurance policy was a right to property that was attachable
by the IRS.149
In United States v. Rodgers,150  the Court held that exemptions
created by state law against the forced sale of jointly owned property
were ineffective against a federal lien. 151 Although Texas law protected
homestead property from a forced sale for the payment of debts, the
Court held that the federal lien could attach to the homestead property
for the unpaid taxes of one spouse. 152 The Court emphasized, though,
144. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
145. See Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 427-29 (analyzing the
language used by the Supreme Court when deciding the role of state law in federal tax analysis);
see also infra notes 148-66 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of the role of state law in
federal tax analysis).
146. See Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 427-29 (examining the
Supreme Court's analysis of the issue of the role of state law in federal tax analysis).
147. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
148. Id. at 56-57. "[O]nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interest in
the insured [taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [what is now § 6321 of the Code], state law
is inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens created by federal statutes in favor of the United
States." Id.
149. Id. "Cash surrender value" is "money a policyowner is entitled to receive from an
insurance company upon surrendering a life insurance policy with cash value." BARRON'S
DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS 93 (3d ed. 2000).
150. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
151. Id. at 701. The Court noted that the court of appeals in this case had examined whether
Texas law provided an exemption from a federal tax lien for homestead property. Id. at 700-01.
The court of appeals held that, without any vested property rights, the exemption under Texas law
for a homestead interest would not keep a federal lien from attaching. Id. at 701. The court of
appeals, however, barred the government from forcing a sale of the property because it was
homestead property under state law. Id.
152. Id. at 690-91. In its analysis, the Court divided the substance of the Texas law into two
categories: (1) Texas law establishing a homestead estate, which, by the Texas Constitution, is
beyond the reach of most creditors; and (2) Texas law giving individual family members' rights
in the homestead property. Id. at 684. The Texas Constitution provides:
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that the tax lien could only reach the property interest of the debtor
spouse. 153  The Court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution allows the federal government to disregard state law
exemptions.
154
Alternatively, in Aquilino v. United States,155 the Court expressly
stated that state law defines property. 156  The Court concluded that
courts were to apply state law to determine the taxpayer's interest in the
property. 157  The Aquilino Court held that state law should be used to
determine if there is property, and that federal law then determines
whether a federal lien can attach. 158  The Court reasoned that this
approach would balance the traditional state interest of defining
property and the federal interest of uniform administration of the
revenue statutes. 
159
The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected
from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for [certain exceptions not
relevant here] .... No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever
be valid, except for [certain exceptions not relevant here].
Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50) (alteration in original). In a separate clause, the Texas
Constitution further provides that each spouse owning homestead property must receive the
consent of the other spouse before selling or abandoning the property. Id. at 684-85 (quoting
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50). The Court further noted that, in Texas, the homestead right is not
just a right given by statute, but also a vested property right. Id. at 686 ("[T]he Texas homestead
right is not a mere statutory entitlement, but a vested property right.").
153. Id. at 690-91.
154. Id. at 701.
155. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
156. id. at 512-13.
The threshold question in this case, as in all cases where the Federal Government
asserts its tax lien, is whether and to what extent the taxpayer had "property" or "rights
to property" to which the tax lien could attach. In answering that question, both federal
and state courts must look to state law, for it has long been the rule that "in the
application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the
legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property ....
Id. (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940)) (alteration in original).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 514.
159. Id. ("This approach strikes a proper balance between the legitimate and traditional
interest which the State has in creating and defining the property interest of its citizens, and the
necessity for a uniform administration of the federal revenue statutes."). The Court's holding in
Aquilino did not overrule Bess, however. See Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra
note 47, at 428-29 (noting that the language of Aquilino, as to the role of state law in federal tax
analysis, is distinguishable from prior cases). Furthermore, Aquilino was not overruled by the
Court's holding in United States v. Drye. Id. Johnson noted:
[E]ven [Aquilino] can be reconcilable. To say that state law must be looked to in
making the property status determination is not to say that state law is the only thing to
be considered. Tunnel vision is not required. Drye too requires that state law be
looked to, but only up to a certain point and not exclusively. Aquilino is not terminally
incompatible with that approach.
Id. at 429.
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The more recent Court decisions regarding the treatment of the role
of state law in federal tax analysis followed the same steps, all of them
noting that the rule has never changed. 160 For example, in 1971 the
Court held that the federal statutes determined when and how the
property should be taxed after state law created the legal interests with
respect to the property. 16 1 The Court noted that these principles were
not new in the law of taxation. 16 2  In addition, the Court in United
States v. National Bank of Commerce 163 stated that the issue of whether
a state law right constitutes "property" or "rights to property" was a
matter of federal law. 164 In 1994, the Court in United States v. Irvine
165
illustrated the rule that even though state law determined the legal
interest and the rights one had in property, the federal law would
determine how those interests would be taxed.' 66
4. Current State of the Law: Drye v. United States
Finally, in 1999, the Court examined the issue again and clarified the
roles of state law and federal law in defining property and property
rights. 167 In Drye v. United States, the Court unanimously upheld a lien
attached to a spendthrift trust, reasoning that the state law only
determined whether an interest is created, and then federal law
determined whether the interest is property or a property right.1
68
160. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 429-30.
161. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971); see also Johnson, The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 429 (noting that the Court clearly stated the role of state law
in federal tax analysis).
162. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 197 ("[T]hese principles are long established in the law of
taxation.").
163. United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985)
164. Id. at 727 (citing United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958)).
165. United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994).
166. Id. at 238. The Court noted that this was a "general and longstanding rule in federal tax
cases." Id. In Irvine, the Court held that a state law allowing an individual to disclaim a gift
would not force the federal gift tax to be "struck blind" to the fact that the transfer of "property"
or "property rights" for which the gift tax was due had already occurred. See id. at 239-40
("[State property transfer rules do not transfer into federal taxation rules."); see also Johnson,
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 429-30 (discussing the Irvine decision).
167. See Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 429-30 (discussing
whether Drye changed or clarified the role of state law in federal tax analysis). The Court in Drye
recognized that there was confusion as to whether federal or state law controlled whether a
taxpayer had sufficient interest in property to be subject to a federal tax lien for unpaid taxes.
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 57 (1999) (stating that the Court's "decisions in point have
not been phrased so meticulously").
168. Drye, 528 U.S. at 52 ("The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly read
to look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law
the determination whether those rights or interests constitute 'property' or 'rights to property'
within the meaning of § 6321 .").
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Rohn Drye owed the federal government $325,000 for taxes he did
not pay.169 The federal government had already filed notices of federal
tax liens when Mr. Drye's mother died intestate. 170  Under Arkansas
law, Mr. Drye was the sole heir to her estate worth about $233,000.171
If Mr. Drye had accepted his inheritance, the IRS would have seized the
property and taken it pursuant to the lien they had already placed upon
it.172 Thus, Mr. Drye disclaimed his inheritance, 173 allowing it to pass
by operation of law to his daughter. 174  Under Arkansas law, when a
disclaimer is properly filed, the state treats the disclaimant as if he had
predeceased the decedent.1 75  Thus, the disclaimant's creditors cannot
reach the property because the disclaiming heir is considered to have
never owned or controlled the property. 176  Upon receiving the
inheritance, Mr. Drye's daughter placed the inherited property in a
spendthrift trust, listing herself and her parents as beneficiaries. 177 The
IRS filed a lien against the trust and a notice of levy on its accounts; the
trust filed a wrongful levy suit in response.
178
The Court relied on the Internal Revenue Code and case law to
determine that federal law defines property after the state law has
recognized an interest. 179 While the Code does not create "property" or
"rights to property," it determines when a lien can attach once the rights
have been recognized. 180  Furthermore, the Court noted that the
language used by Congress in § 6321 of the Code "is broad and reveals
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court applied the law of the state in which the property was located-Arkansas.
Id. Under the law of Arkansas, like that of many states, an heir may file a disclaimer up to nine
months after the death of the decedent to disclaim an inheritance. Id. at 53 (citing ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 28-2-101, 28-2-107 (Michie 1987)).
174. Id. at 52.
175. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-2-108 (Michie 1987).
176. Id.
177. Drye, 528 U.S. at 54. A spendthrift trust is a trust that prohibits the beneficiary from
assigning his or her equitable interest and also prevents a creditor from attaching that interest.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999).
178. Drye, 528 U.S. at 54.
179. Id. at 57-58. Interestingly, the Court did not distinguish the difference between
"property" and "rights to property," nor did the Court define "property" and "rights to property."
See id. However, the Court did refer to prior definitions of "property" and "rights to property."
Id. at 55-60. The Court held that "' [t]he important consideration is the breadth of the control the
[taxpayer] could exercise over the property."' Id. at 61 (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S.
78, 83-84 (1940)).
180. Id. at 57 & n.4 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722
(1985)).
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on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a
taxpayer might have." 181  The Court also reasoned that the list of
property exempt from a tax levy created in § 6334(a) of the Code is
exclusive.
182
The Court rejected the gift analogy given by Mr. Drye. 18  Mr. Drye
compared his action of rejecting the inheritance to that of a person
rejecting a gift. 184 The Court noted a critical distinction between a gift
rejected while the giver is alive and a gift rejected when the giver is
deceased.185 When a gift is rejected while the giver is alive, the giver is
restored to his or her pre-gift status. 186 This is not true when the gift is
inherited because the giver cannot be returned to the status quo when an
inheritance is rejected. 187  The Court concluded that Mr. Drye did not
just reject the gift, but also determined who would get the gift. 181 The
Court held that a disclaimer is a right to property to which a federal tax
lien can attach because the person disclaiming the property exercises
sufficient dominion over the decision to accept the property or to direct
it to a known other.
189
After the Supreme Court's decision in Drye, it is clear that federal
law determines whether an interest given by state law is "property" or
"rights to property." However, the next question becomes: how does
federal law define "property" or "rights to property"? Because neither
the Code nor its related IRS regulations define "property" or "rights to
181. Id. at 56 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719-20
(1985)). Section 6321 states that a federal tax lien can attach to "all property and rights to
property" that a taxpayer may have. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000). It seems, then, "[flor § 6321 purposes,
'all' means 'all.' Thus, 'all property and rights to property' encompasses all undivided property
interests as surely as it does all separate property interests." Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the
Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 866 (footnote omitted).
182. Drye, 528 U.S. at 56; see supra note 46 (identifying property exempt from the
attachment of federal tax liens). "The fact that.. . Congress provided specific exemptions from
distraint is evidence that Congress did not intend to recognize further exemptions which would
prevent attachment of [federal tax] liens." Drye, 528 U.S. at 56 (citing United States v. Bess, 357
U.S. 51, 57 (1958)); see also supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Bess).
183. Drye, 528 U.S. at 60-61.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at61.
189. Id. Drye did not change the existing law created by United States v. Bess, United States
v. Rodgers, and Aquilino v. United States; it just clarified it. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, supra note 47, at 429-32; see also supra Part II.D.3 (discussing the Supreme Court analysis
prior to Drye).
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property," looking to case law is the only way to answer the question. 190
In Drye, the Court noted possible criteria for property, which it had
distinguished in previous cases:
-"'every species of right or interest protected by law and having an
exchangeable value,"'
-a right to gain possession of an item, even if such possession does not
amount to ownership,
-items available to the taxpayer," 'within her reach to enjoy,'
-"any beneficial interest, as opposed to 'bare legal title,' in the [asset]
at issue,"
-"a valuable, transferable, legally protected right to the property at
issue,"
-"rights or interests that have pecuniary value and are transferable,"
and
-more than a mere expectancy, even if valuable and transferable.
19 1
While the Court did consider these formulations for a general
understanding of the reach of § 6321, it did not take any or all of them
as the final definition.
192
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Craft expanded the
reach of a federal tax lien to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan
determined that a federal tax lien could attach to the tenancy-by-the-
entirety property once the property was conveyed to a single owner,
Mrs. Craft. 193 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court decision, holding that the Crafts had no separate interest in the
property to which a lien could attach. 194  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and in a 6-3 decision, allowed the IRS to attach a federal tax
190. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 421.
191. Id. at 422 (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 56, 58-60) (footnotes omitted).
192. Id. However, these prior definitions combine to form five elements, none of which is
dispositive to finding "property" or "rights to property." Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at
1179. The five elements provide that (1) a debtor should possess or have the ability to enjoy the
property; and that a debtor's interest should be (2) protected by law; (3) exchangeable and
transferable; (4) valuable; and (5) more than just bare title or a mere expectancy. Id.
193. Craft 1, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680 at *2-3 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 12, 1994), rev'd,
140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002); see infra Part ILI.B (discussing the
district court's opinion).
194. Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002)
[hereinafter Craft II]; see infra Part III.C (discussing the Sixth Circuit's decision).
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lien to the property. 195  The majority opinion was accompanied by
critical dissents by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
19 6
A. Facts of Craft
In 1972, Mr. and Mrs. Craft purchased a home in Michigan as
tenants-by-the-entirety. 197 Mr. Craft failed to file his federal income tax
returns from 1979 through 1986.198 By 1988, the IRS determined that
Mr. Craft owed more than $480,000 in unpaid income tax liabilities. 199
The IRS made an assessment against him, and he did not pay. z20 The
following year, the IRS attached a federal tax lien to all property and
rights to property belonging to him.20 1  In late August, about five
months after the lien was filed, the couple conveyed the property to
Mrs. Craft by a quitclaim deed for only one dollar.20 2  The IRS,
however, asserted that the lien attached to Mr. Craft's interest in the
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety.
203
Subsequently, Mrs. Craft tried to sell the piece of land; however, a
title search showed that the IRS had a lien on the property, which
prevented the sale.204 Mrs. Craft requested that the IRS release the lien
205
on the property, and the IRS refused. The IRS finally agreed to
release the lien on the property to allow her to sell the land, under the
condition that she establish a non-interest bearing escrow account to
contain half of the proceeds from the sale of the land, which would be
subject to the same title, right, and interest that the federal tax lien had
on the property. 206 Mrs. Craft sold the property for almost $120,000
and placed half of the proceeds in the escrow account.
20 7
Mrs. Craft then brought an action to quiet title to the proceeds in the
escrow account.2 08  The government argued that the federal tax lien
195. United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1425-26 (2002) [hereinafter Craft 1111.
196. Id. at 1426; see infra Part II.D (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions).
197. Craft 11, 140 F.3d at 639.
198. Id.
199. Id. The IRS assessed his unpaid tax liabilities at $482,446.73. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. A quitclaim deed is a deed that conveys the grantor's entire interest in real property
to another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 424 (7th ed. 1999). However, a quitclaim deed does not
guarantee that the title is valid. Id.
203. Craft II, 140 F.3d at 640.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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attached to the husband's interest in the property held in tenancy-by-
the-entirety when the conveyance of the deed to Mrs. Craft effectively
terminated the tenancy-by-the-entirety. 20 9 Thus, the government argued
that the federal tax lien attached when Mr. Craft possessed a separate,
one-half interest in the property.2 10 The government also claimed that
Mr. Craft had fraudulently conveyed his interest in the property to Mrs.
Craft.21 1
B. The District Court's Decision
The district court, ruling in the government's favor, held that the
federal tax lien could attach to the property at the moment Mr. Craft
conveyed his interest to his wife, severing the tenancy-by-the-
212entirety. The district court noted the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cole
v. Cardoza, which reasoned that under Michigan law tenants-by-the-
entirety hold property under a single title.213 Because the property was
held under a single title, a tax lien against only one spouse could not
attach to the property. 2 14  The district court determined that the
conveyance effectively terminated the tenancy-by-the-entirety estate.
215
Consequently, the federal tax lien could attach at the moment of
conveyance because Mr. Craft had a separate one-half interest.
216
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 640-41.
213. Craft 1, No.1: 93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 1994), rev'd,
140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002); see also supra notes 119-21
(discussing the holding in Cole v. Cardoza).
214. Id. at *3. This decision hinged on the court's reliance of the Fischre decision, which
reasoned:
[E]ven though each spouse has an indivisible interest in the entireties property and
owns it as a whole, each also holds an individual interest .... This individual interest
is not realized and remains inchoate until the entireties estate is terminated by the death
of one spouse, divorce or joint conveyance. ... As long as the entireties estate is
intact, the property is not subject to levy and execution by the creditors of one spouse.
Yet, each spouse's survivorship interest is distinct, cognizable, and sufficient to
support attachment of a creditor's lien.
Id. (quoting Fischre v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 628, 630 (W.D. Mich. 1994)) (alteration in
original); see also Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that a federal
tax lien could not attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety property for the debt of one spouse); supra
notes 89-124 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning and analysis in Cole and
Fischre).
215. Craft II, 140 F.3d at 640 (discussing the district court's findings).
216. Id.
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C. The Sixth Circuit's Decision
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that no lien
attached because Mr. Craft had no separate interest in the land as it was
held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 2 17 The court cited Bess, Aquilino, and
National Bank of Commerce in its analysis, determining that once state
law has created a sufficient interest, the federal law dictates the tax
consequences. 2 18 The court recognized that the government's tax liens
could attach to every interest in property a taxpayer might have, even if
the interest is not full ownership or is an interest among several claims
of ownership against the property. 2 19 Even so, the court determined that
more recent cases would not allow a state's definition of a property
interest to be overridden by federal law.
220
The court analyzed Michigan law and determined that one spouse did
not possess a separate interest in tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 22 1
The majority relied on the common-law fiction that property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety is not owned by either of the spouses, but
owned instead by the marital unit.22 2  As a result, the court held that,
because the property was held in tenancy-by-the-entirety and the debt
223was only that of Mr. Craft, a federal lien could not attach. Because,
under Michigan law, creditors for the debts of only one spouse could
not attach property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety, the court concluded
217. See id. at 644.
218. Id. at 641; see also supra Part II.D.3 (discussing Bess, Aquilino, and National Bank of
Commerce). Because the federal tax law "'creates no property rights but merely attaches
consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law,"' the court must first look at
state law to determine whether there is a property interest. Craft H1, 140 F.3d at 641 (quoting
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958)). Therefore, "'state law controls in determining the
nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property."' Id. (quoting Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960) (quoting Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940))).
"'[O]nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interest in the [taxpayer] to
satisfy the requirements of [the statute], state law is inoperative,' and the tax consequences
thenceforth are dictated by federal law." Id. (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985) (quoting Bess, 357 U.S. at 56-57)).
219. Craft H, 140 F.3d at 641 (citing United States v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 870 F.2d 338,
341 (6th Cir. 1989); Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 725, 730)).
220. Id. at 643. The court noted that the cases "do not support the proposition that federal law
can be used to trump a state's definition of a property interest." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text (discussing the rights given to spouses
holding property in tenancy-by-the-entirety); supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing
the state of the law in Michigan regarding tenancy-by-the-entirety property before Craft 1).
223. Craft II, 140 F.3d at 643 ("[A] federal tax lien against one spouse cannot attach to
property held by that spouse as an entireties estate.").
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that the federal tax lien could not be attached to this property for the
separate debts of one spouse.
224
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court
decided, by a 6-3 margin, to reverse the Sixth Circuit's decision.225 The
majority held that Mr. Craft's interests in the tenancy-by-the-entirety
property constituted "property" or "rights to property" to which a
federal lien could attach.226 Justice Scalia's critical dissent, however,
argued that this decision would remove the protection for non-debtor
spouses. 2 27 Moreover, Justice Thomas's critical dissent argued that the
longstanding consensus in the lower courts, combined with the fact that
the federal government had not defined "property," should have
indicated that a federal tax lien could not attach to tenancy-by-the-
entirety property.228
1. Majority Opinion
The majority held that Mr. Craft's interest in the tenancy-by-the-
entirety property constituted "property" or "rights to property" to which
a federal tax lien could attach. 229 The majority looked first to state law
to determine what rights Mr. Craft had in the property because federal
tax law did not create property rights, but merely attached federally
defined consequences to state law created rights. 230 The Court used the
common idiom "a bundle of sticks" to describe the individual rights of
property, noting that state law established which sticks were in one's
bundle. 231  The majority then looked at federal law to determine
whether the "bundle of sticks" given to Mr. and Mrs. Craft in their
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety would qualify as "property" or
"rights to property" under the federal tax lien statute. 232
224. Id.
225. Although the Court followed the analysis of Drye, which was unanimously decided by
the same members of the Court just three years prior, the Court split 6-3 in Craft III. Craft III,
122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
226. Craft Il, 122 S. Ct. at 1425.
227. Id. at 1426 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra Part In.D.2 (discussing Justice Scalia's
dissent, with whom Justice Thomas joined).
228. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1428-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.D.3
(discussing Justice Thomas's dissent, with whom Justices Stevens and Scalia joined).
229. Craft II1, 122 S. Ct. at 1420.
230. Id. Most recently, in Drye, the Court clarified this analysis. Drye, 528 U.S. at 58.
231. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1420.
232. Id. at 1420, 1422.
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The Court looked at the substance of the rights given by Michigan
law and determined what rights Mr. Craft had in the property. 233
According to Michigan law, Mr. Craft had the following rights
associated with the property:
The right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it,
the right to a share of income produced from it, the right of
survivorship, the right to become a tenant in common with equal
shares upon divorce, the right to sell the property with the
respondent's consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale,
the right to place an encumbrance on the property with the
respondent's consent, and the right to block respondent from selling or
encumbering the property unilaterally.
234
Then the Court analyzed the "bundle of sticks" granted to Mr. Craft by
Michigan law and determined whether the bundle qualified as
"property" or "rights to property" under § 6321 of the Code. 235 To
ensure the collection of taxes, the Court reasoned that Congress used the
broadest terminology so every interest a taxpayer might have could be
reached by the federal tax lien.236 In fact, the Court noted, Congress
could not have used more powerful language to guarantee the collection
of taxes.
237
The majority determined that because Michigan law granted a tenant-
by-the-entirety "some of the most essential property rights," Mr. Craft's
rights in the property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety would fall within
the broad language of § 6321 of the Code.238 The Court reasoned that
the right to use, the right to exclude others, and the right to receive
income were essential rights, which alone might have constituted a
sufficient interest to consider it "property" or "rights to property" within
the broad statutory language of § 6321.239
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Mr. Craft was granted more
than just the right to use, exclude others, and receive income. 24 0 Even
though Mr. Craft's property interest did not contain a common stick in
the "bundle of sticks"-it was not unilaterally alienable-the Court
reasoned that unilateral alienation was not essential to property
233. Id. at 1422.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1422-23.
236. Id. at 1422 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 720
(1985)).
237. Id. at 1423 (quoting Glass City Bank v. United States, 328 U.S. 265, 267 (1945)).
238. Id. at 1423-24.
239. Id. at 1423 (citing Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 61 (1999)).
240. Id.
2002]
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ownership. 24 1 The Court further reasoned that to exclude property that
is not unilaterally alienable from the property to which federal tax liens
could attach would create an exemption for a large amount of what is
generally thought of as property.
242
In addition, as part of his bundle of sticks, Mr. Craft possessed a
future right of survivorship.243 The Court determined that if it held that
there were no "property" or "rights to property," then tenancy-by-the-
entirety property would belong to no one because neither spouse had a
greater interest than the other.244 The Court reasoned that such a result
would create an opportunity for taxpayer manipulation and abuse.
245
Accordingly, the Court held that Mr. Craft had sufficient rights in the
property to qualify his interest as "property" or "rights to property" such
that the federal tax lien could attach.246
The Court dismissed the dissenting Justices' argument that the
majority's holding-that there was an interest in the tenancy-by-the-
entirety property to which a federal tax lien could attach-created a
conflict with the rules for tax liens relating to partnership property.
247
The majority reasoned that a federal tax lien does attach to the fair
market value of an individual partner's share of the partnership
assets.248  Furthermore, the majority argued that to hold otherwise
would depart from partnership law because the federal tax lien could not
attach to Mr. Craft's interest when it could attach to an individual
partner's interest in partnership property.
249
The Court addressed the argument that Congress did not intend for
federal tax liens to reach property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety
because a proposed amendment,250 which would have included tenancy-
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1422-23.
243. Id. at 1424. The Court did not address the issue of whether this interest was merely an
expectancy, since there were already a number of sticks present in Mr. Craft's bundle of rights in
the property. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The Court reasoned that the result "not only seems absurd, but would also allow
spouses to shield their property from federal taxation by classifying it as entireties property,
facilitating abuse of the federal tax system." Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing B. BITrKER & M. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
44.5[4][a] (2d ed. 1995 & 2000 Cum. Supp.)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1425. The amendment would "clarif[y] the term 'property and rights to property'
by expressly including therein the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the entirety."
H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 4132 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4554; see also
supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of § 6321).
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by-the-entirety property in the list of "property" and "rights to property"
covered under the federal tax lien statute, failed.251  The Court reasoned,
however, that several plausible inferences could be made from the
inaction of Congress to change the wording of the statute, concluding
that the proposed amendment in 1954 was just a "clarification" of
existing law. 252 Alternatively, it may have been rejected because the
suggested amending language 253 was excessive.
254
The Court recognized that Michigan law exempted property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety from the reach of state law creditors when the
debt was from one of the spouses alone. 2 55  Still, the Court reasoned
that state law in no way binds the federal courts when answering
whether a federal tax lien can attach to property held in tenancy-by-the-
entirety. 256 Therefore, the majority concluded that Mr. Craft's interest
constituted "property" or "rights to property" under § 6321 of the
Code. 257
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, who joined in Justice Thomas's dissent, wrote
separately to point out that, in his opinion, the Court had abolished a
form of property ownership with respect to federal taxes. 258 He argued
that treating the marital partnership as a legal entity, which was
protected from the individual debts of a sole spouse, was no different
than the decision to treat commercial partnerships as a legal entity.
259
251. Craft 1II, 122 S. Ct. at 1425. The majority noted that the Court has held that "failed
legislative proposals are 'a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a
prior statute."' Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650
(1990)).
252. Id.; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 187 (1994) ("Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the
existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.").
253. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of §
6321 of the Code).
254. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate's remarks to the
proposal, noting the legislative history of § 6321 of the Code).
255. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1425.
256. Id. at 1425-26.
257. Id. at 1426.
258. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.D.3 (discussing the dissent by Justice
Thomas). Scalia writes, "[T]he Court nullifies (insofar as federal taxes are concerned, at least) a
form of property ownership that was of particular benefit to the stay-at-home spouse or mother."
Craft I11, 122 S. Ct. at 1426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia argues that a state's decision
to protect tenancy-by-the-entirety property "is no more novel and no more 'artificial' than a
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He further argued that the majority's holding eliminated the protection
that was once afforded to stay-at-home mothers by many of the
states.
260
3. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens
and Justice Scalia joined.26 1 The dissent argued that the Court allowed
a federal tax lien to reach property that did not actually belong to the
debtor taxpayer.26 2 The dissent further argued that the majority opinion
conflicted with a consensus of the lower courts and the IRS.263 The
dissent agreed that the real property held by the Crafts when the federal
tax lien attached was held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 264  However, the
dissent reasoned that the conveyance to Mrs. Craft terminated the
tenancy-by-the-entirety. 2 65 Because a federal tax lien could not extend
beyond the property interests held by the delinquent taxpayer, the IRS
was only entitled to half the proceeds from the conveyance, in this case
fifty cents.
266
The dissent analyzed whether, at the time of the conveyance, Mr.
Craft had an interest that constituted property or rights to property.
267
The dissent reasoned that under English common-law, property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety was held in a "sole tenancy," giving neither
spouse a separate interest.26 8 Thus, the property held by Mr. and Mrs.
Craft did not "belong" to either one of them individually when the IRS
State's decision to treat the commercial partnership as a separate legal entity, whose property
cannot be encumbered by the debts of its individual members." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[The stay-at-home mother] is overwhelmingly likely to be the survivor that obtains title
to the unencumbered property; and she (as opposed to her businessworld husband) is
overwhelmingly unlikely to be the source of the individual indebtedness against which
a tenancy by the entirety protects. It is regrettable that the Court has eliminated a large
part of this traditional protection retained by many States.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[The holding] eviscerates the statutory distinction
between 'property' and 'rights to property' drawn by § 6321, and conflicts with an unbroken line
of authority from this Court, the lower courts, and the IRS.").
264. Id. at 1427 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 229-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's analysis of the rights to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety).
265. Craft III, 122 S. Ct. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also notes 97-111 and
accompanying text (discussing United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990),
and analyzing the ways in which tenancy-by-the-entirety can be terminated under Michigan law).
266. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1427 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1427 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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placed a lien on the property. 269 Therefore, the dissent concluded that
Mr. Craft did not have an interest that constituted property to which a
federal tax lien could attach.27°
Next, the dissent looked to Drye. 27 1 The dissent asserted that Drye
stood for the proposition that state laws could exempt a type of property
from federal tax liability after the interest in the property had been
272created. In Drye, the Court held that a disclaimer was a right to
property to which a federal tax lien could attach because the person
disclaiming the property already had a vested right in it, which the
disclaimant could not undo.
273
Further, the dissent argued that the majority created a new, federal
common-law definition of property, believing that the Court's holding
disregarded the rule that the states define and control the scope of
property. 274  The dissent also noted that a taxpayer's property rights
under federal law were uncertain.
275
Agreeing with the majority that Michigan law created property rights
to property held as tenants-by-the-entirety, the dissent noted that
Michigan law was unsettled as to whether these rights were individual
rights "belonging to" each tenant. 27 6  Additionally, the dissent noted
that the majority did not suggest which of the rights given to Mr. Craft
was sufficient for the tax lien to attach.277
Furthermore, the dissent attacked the Court's reasoning because it did
not address the difference between "property" and "rights to
property. ' 278  First, the dissent analyzed whether Mr. Craft had any
"rights to property" to which the federal tax lien could attach.27 9 The
269. Id. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Because Michigan does not recognize a separate
spousal interest in the Grand Rapids property, it did not 'belong' to either ... individually when
the IRS asserted its lien ....").
270. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 167-92 and accompanying text
(discussing the analysis and holding of Drye).
273. Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1428 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513
(1960)).
276. Id. at 1429 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 1429 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Section 6321 states that a federal tax lien can attach to "all
property and rights to property." I.R.C. § 6321 (2001); see also notes 179-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of § 6321 in Drye).
279. Craft I1, 122 S. Ct. at 1429 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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dissent concluded that he did not have any rights to the property.280
The dissent reasoned that any rights Mr. Craft might have had did not
resemble rights to which a federal tax lien had ever attached.28 1 "Rights
to property" that have been subject to a federal tax lien are valuable and
282can be measured. However, the dissent reasoned that a tenant
holding property in tenancy-by-the-entirety has no present divisible
interest in the property: he or she could not sell, encumber, or transfer
the property without spousal consent.2 83 Additionally, Mr. Craft did not
possess the ability to devise the property. 2 84 The dissent agreed that a
federal tax lien could attach to a tenant's right in property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety and to rents, products, incomes, or profits
created from the property.285 Here, however, as the dissent pointed out,
the property did not create any rents, income, or profits to which the lien
could attach.286
Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that the rights given through
tenancy-by-the-entirety are dependent on the taxpayer's status as a
spouse and, therefore, had a lack of exchangeable value or were mere
expectancies. 2 87 The dissent reasoned that all of the "rights to property"
to which the federal tax lien attached were destroyed when Mr. and
288Mrs. Craft severed the tenancy by the quitclaim deed. The dissent
reasoned that because the federal government steps into the "taxpayer's
shoes" when attaching a lien, if the rights in the property have been289
destroyed, so has the government's interest. Therefore, the dissent
concluded, Mr. Craft had neither "property" nor "rights to property"
sufficient for the federal tax lien to attach.290
Additionally, the dissent noted the enormous precedent supporting its
position among the lower courts.2 9 1  The dissent argued that while
280. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent simply stated: "He did not." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
281. Id. at 1429 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM D. ELLIOT, FED. TAX COLLECTION, LIENS,
AND LEVIES 909 [3][a]-[f] (1995 & 2000 Cum. Supp.)).
283. Id. at 1430 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1430 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
289. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 1432 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 1431-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas cited cases from across the country,
which all concluded that a federal tax lien cannot attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety property to
satisfy the debts of one spouse:
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precedent does not bind the Court, it should have at least been
addressed, pointing out that the majority failed to mention the precedent
in its reasoning. 292
The dissent admitted that ownership by "the marriage" is a state law
fiction. 293  However, it determined that this fiction should not change
the result in this case, reasoning that the state law definition should have
been followed because federal law does not define property. 294 It noted
further that if the tax liability was that of both tenants, then the property
held in tenancy-by-the-entirety would be subject to a federal tax lien.295
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's assumption that
without holding that the lien attaches to property held in tenancy-by-
the-entirety, the Court would be facilitating tax fraud by married
individuals. 2 96  The government never appealed the lower court's
decision that the transfer by quitclaim deed was fraudulent.
297
Furthermore, the dissent noted that there was no factual evidence
presented that showed that if the Court had reached a different result,
there would be "wholesale tax fraud.
' 298
IRS v. Gaster, 42 F.3d 787, 791 (C.A.3 1994) (concluding that the IRS is not entitled to
a lien on property owned as a tenancy by the entirety to satisfy the tax obligations of
one spouse); Pitts v. United States, 946 F.2d 1569, 1571-1572 (C.A.4 1991) (same);
United States v. American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504, 507 (C.A.5), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 835, 79 S.Ct. 58, 3 L.Ed.2d 72 (1958) (same); Raffaele v. Granger,
196 F.2d 620, 622-623 (C.A.3 1952) (same); United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d
326, 331 (C.A.8 1951) (explaining that the interest of one spouse in tenancy by the
entirety property "is not a right to property or property in any sense"); United States v.
Nathanson, 60 F.Supp. 193, 194 (E.D.Mich.1945) (finding no designation in the
Federal Revenue Act for imposing tax upon property held by the entirety for taxes due
from one person alone); Shaw v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 245, 246 (W.D.Mich.1939)
(recognizing that the nature of the estate under Michigan law precludes the tax lien
from attaching to tenancy by the entirety property for the tax liability of one spouse).
See also Benson v. United States, 442 F.2d 1221, 1223 (C.A.D.C.1971) (recognizing
the Government's concession that property owned by the parties as tenants by the
entirety cannot be subjected to a tax lien for the debt of one tenant); Cole v. Cardoza,
441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (C.A.6 1971) (noting Government concession that, under
Michigan law, it had no valid claim against real property held by tenancy by the
entirety).
Id. at 1431 n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 1432 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "[O]ne would be hard pressed to explain why the
combined weight of these judicial and administrative sources-including the IRS' instructions to
its own employees-do not constitute relevant authority." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The majority correctly held that a federal tax lien should attach to
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. This Part first demonstrates
why the lower court precedent prohibiting creditors from reaching
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety was not upheld.299 This Part
then turns to the state law analysis of tenancy-by-the-entirety
property. 30 0  Next, this Part discusses how the state law rights given to
Mr. Craft are "property" or "rights to property" such that a federal tax
lien should attach.30 1 Finally, this Part addresses the dissent's mistaken
argument that there are no protections for non-debtor spouses.
30 2
A. Lower Courts' Precedent
Even though a considerable amount of precedent among the lower
courts has led citizens and lawyers to rely on the tenancy-by-the-
entirety protections from creditors, 30 3 the majority decision was correct.
Courts have followed the rule barring creditors from reaching property
held in tenancy-by-the-entirety for decades. 304  But, this rule is derived305
solely from lower court decisions. Furthermore, since the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Rodgers306 and United States v. National
299. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the prior rule barring creditors from attaching
tenancy-by-the-entirety property was only developed by lower court decisions).
300. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the opportunities and controls that Mr. Craft had in the
property, given Michigan state law).
301. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the broad power of the IRS to reach every interest in
property).
302. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the protections for non-debtor spouses).
303. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1188; see Craft 111, 122 S. Ct. at 1431 n.8
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing lower court decisions that held that a federal tax lien could not
attach to tenancy-by-the-entirety property to satisfy the debts of one spouse); see also Raffaele v.
Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1952) (concluding that the IRS is not entitled to attach a
lien on tenancy-by-the-entirety property to satisfy the tax obligations of one spouse); United
States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951) (explaining the interest of one spouse in
tenancy-by-the-entirety property "is not a right to property or property in any sense"); supra Parts
II.D.2.a-b (discussing Hutcherson and Raffaele).
304. See supra Part II.D (discussing the case law before Craft); cf. Cox v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d
390, 392 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the reasoning behind the protection from creditors for
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety was flawed). In Cox, the Eighth Circuit determined that
recent case law had been eroding the protection from creditors for tenancy-by-the-entirety
property. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1175 n.72. "[It now is clear that the whole
entirety estate is vested and held in each spouse .... [T]he ownership interest is in the spouses,
and not in a separate entity." Cox, 121 F.3d at 392.
305. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1188.
306. Even when the Supreme Court decided Rodgers, it signaled doubt that the lower court
decisions relating to the tenancy-by-the-entirety bar were correct. Johnson, After Drye, supra
note 27, at 1188; see also United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 703 n.31 (1983) ("if the
tenancy by the entirety cases are correct" (emphasis in original)).
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Bank of Commerce,307 many commentators have cast doubt on the
strength of the lower courts' rulings.30 8  Under Rodgers, the
government forced a sale of homestead property, despite the fact that
the debtor could not unilaterally alienate the property. 30 9  Homestead
property interests are similar to tenancy-by-the-entirety interests, in that
neither spouse acting alone can alienate the property. 310
In addition, the lower court decisions rest on a misapprehension of
the role of state law in the analysis of whether a federal tax lien can
attach to property. 3 11  These courts have looked to state law to
characterize the opportunity or benefit that the state law has given the
31231owner of the property. That approach takes state law too far.313
Under the analysis of Drye, the decision of whether the opportunities or
benefits given to an owner of property by state law is property or a right
to property is a decision of federal law, not state law. 314
Furthermore, the concept on which the lower court decisions were
based-that the property was held by neither of the spouses-has
eroded away.3 15  Ever since states began adopting the Married
Women's Property Acts, the idea that the "marital union" holds
316tenancy-by-the-entirety property has not been followed. Courts
acknowledge that either both spouses or each spouse owns the tenancy-
by-the-entirety property, even in states where creditors are barred from
307. See supra Part Il.D.3 (analyzing Rodgers and National Bank of Commerce).
308. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1190 n. 165. "Perhaps it is only a matter of time
before a spouse's tenancy by entirety interest will be subject to federal tax lien attachment by
creeping federal supremacy." WILLIAM D. ELLIO-rF, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTIONS, LIENS &
LEVIES 9-92 at 9.09[4][d] (2d ed. Cum. Supp. No. 2 2002). Before the decisions by the Court in
Rodgers and National Bank of Commerce, a tax lien could not attach to jointly held property until
the debtor taxpayer survived the spouse and became the outright owner of the property. Joanne
Phillips, Comment, United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce: Co-Owners Suffer the "Federal
Law Consequences," II DEL. J. CORP. L. 561, 583 (1987).
309. John F. Hernandez, The Federal Tax Lien: Beyond United States v. Rodgers, 36 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1081, 1098 (1984). "Clearly, a literal reading of section 7403 would invade the tenancy
by the entirety sanctuary." Id.
310. Terrence C. Brown-Steiner, Comment, Federal Tax Liens and Homestead Exceptions:
The Aftermath of United States v. Rodgers, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 279, 323 (1985). "A strong
argument can be made that Rodgers applies to tenancy-by-the-entirety interests." Id.
311. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1174.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.; see supra Part H.D.4 (discussing the current state of the law regarding the role of
state law and federal law in defining "property" and "property rights").
315. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 858.
316. Id.; see supra notes 70-73 (discussing the Married Women's Property Acts and their
impact on tenancy-by-the-entirety property).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
reaching tenancy-by-the-entirety property. 317  Thus, it is difficult to
argue that neither spouse has a property interest in tenancy-by-the-
entirety property. 3
18
B. The First Prong: State Law Analysis
Under the analysis set forth in Drye, to ascertain the amount of
control Mr. Craft had over his property a court must look first at state
law. 319 A court must then look to federal law to determine if the right
given to the taxpayer constitutes a property right to which a tax lien
could attach.320 According to Michigan law, Mr. Craft had many rights
associated with the property.
321
Thus, Michigan law afforded Mr. Craft with many "sticks" in the
"bundle of rights" for this property. 3 22 He had numerous opportunities
and controls with respect to the property held in tenancy-by-the-
entirety. 32 3 He had both a present interest and a future interest.324 The
present interest gave him the right, among others, to use the property, to
exclude others from it, and to receive rents or other profits from it.
325
Mr. Craft had the absolute right to occupy and use the property, and not
even his wife could oust him from possession. 326  Additionally, Mr.
317. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 858.
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 168-89 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis and holding of
Drye); see also supra note 179 (noting the important consideration in determining whether a right
is sufficient to constitute "property" or "right to property"); supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the
Supreme Court case, Drye, which clarified the test for determining if a federal tax lien could
attach to real property).
320. See supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the Drye test for determining if a federal tax lien could
attach to real property).
321. See supra text accompanying note 234 (listing the rights Mr. Craft had in the tenancy-by-
the-entirety property under Michigan law); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.71 (West
1988) ("A husband and wife shall be equally entitled to the rents, products, income, or profits,
and to the control and management of real or personal property held by them as tenants by the
entirety.").
322. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)); see also supra text accompanying note 234 (listing the fights
Mr. Craft had in the tenancy-by-the-entirety property under Michigan law); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.71 (West 1988) (listing the rights given to spouses owning tenancy-by-
the-entirety property in Michigan).
323. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (listing the fights Mr. Craft had in the
tenancy-by-the-entirety property under Michigan law).
324. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2 901(g), (i) (West 2002) (stating that joint property,
including tenancy-by-the-entirety, has both a present interest and a future interest).
325. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (listing the fights given to Mr. Craft by
Michigan law).
326. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (listing the rights given to Mr. Craft by
Michigan law).
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Craft had the future interest of survivorship, which is a significant
contingent right.
327
Under Drye, a court must then analyze the federal law to ascertain
whether the opportunities and controls rise to the level of being
"property" or "rights to property." 328 Michigan has given each spouse
the right to use the property and has prevented one spouse from
alienating the property. 329 Under a federal interpretation of the rights
given to Mr. Craft, the right to use the property is a property interest. 330
Additionally, the right to exclude others has been held by the Court to
be an essential stick in the bundle of rights that is commonly
characterized as property. 331  Mr. Craft can exclude everyone in the
world from the property, except for his wife.332
Even though Michigan does not authorize the seizure of tenancy-by-
the-entirety property for the debts of only one spouse, the Court has
held that state law restrictions do not prevent the attachment and
enforcement of a federal tax lien.333  Pursuant to Michigan state law,
Mr. Craft has the ability to use, receive income from, transfer with the
consent of his wife, and exclude others from his tenancy-by-the-entirety
property.
334
327. Craft I1, 122 S. Ct. at 1424; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2901(g) (stating
that the right of survivorship is the right to receive the property in fee simple absolute upon the
death of the other spouse).
328. See supra Part II.D.4 (analyzing the Supreme Court case, Drye, which clarified the test
for determining if a federal tax lien could attach to real property).
329. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing the rights given to tenants-
by-the-entirety under Michigan law).
330. Dickmann v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984). As the Supreme Court has said, "[T]he
use of valuable property ... is itself a protectible property interest." Id.; see also Johnson, The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 451 (discussing the powers given to Mr. Craft
with respect to the property and how those powers are property rights under federal law).
331. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
332. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1178.
333. See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 59 (1999) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 403
U.S. 190, 204 (1971) (stating that "exempt status under state law does not bind the federal
collector")); see also United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 727 (1985) (noting
that the fact that, under state law, a taxpayer's creditors could not seize or attach a lien to the
property was irrelevant).
334. See supra text accompanying note 234 (listing the rights given to a tenant-by-the-entirety
under Michigan law); see also Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1178 (listing the powers or
rights given to spouses holding property in tenancy-by-the-entirety).
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C. Second Prong: "Congress meant to reach every interest in property
that a taxpayer might have"335
After determining that Mr. Craft has rights and powers over the
tenancy-by-the-entirety property, a court must next analyze whether
these rights and powers are sufficient to constitute "property" or a "right
to property" to which a federal tax lien can attach. 336 When a taxpayer
does not pay his or her taxes after a notice and a demand for payment
have been issued, a lien arises by operation of law.337 To ensure the
collection of taxes, Congress used the broadest possible terminology
338
"to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have."
339
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that this broad federal tax lien
reaches every right or interest having value. 34 0  Thus, "property" and
"rights to property" to which a federal tax lien can attach include many
assorted interests. 341 The valuable, legally protected rights of a tenant-
by-the-entirety are within the scope of this broad and clear statutory
reach.342  Lower courts, however, held that there was an exception to
this very broad and clear language from the legislature.343 To keep the
tenancy-by-the-entirety bar to federal creditors on the basis of precedent
would allow the courts to change the plain meaning of a statute enacted
by Congress.
344
The statutory language states that the federal lien attaches to "all" of
a taxpayer's "property" and "rights to property," not that it attaches to a
taxpayer's "separate" "property" and "rights to property." 345 The Court
has held that the federal tax lien attaches to undivided rights, such as
335. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 720.
336. See supra Part II.D.4 (analyzing the Supreme Court case, Drye, which clarified the test
for determining if a federal tax lien could attach to real property).
337. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000) (permitting a lien "in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property" of that taxpayer).
338. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 720 (quoting Glass City Bank v. United States, 326
U.S. 265, 267 (1945)).
339. Id. at 719-20.
340. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56 (1999) (quoting Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305,
309 (1982)) (The federal tax lien "reach[es] every species of right or interest protected by law and
having an exchangeable value."); see Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 719-20.
341. See, e.g., Drye, 528 U.S. at 56 (holding that an heir's right to inherit property is
"property" to which a federal tax lien can attach under § 6321); Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472
U.S. at 727 (holding that a depositor's right to withdraw the entire contents of a joint bank
account qualifies as "property" to which a federal tax lien can attach under § 6321).
342. See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text (discussing the language and background
of § 6321 of the Code).
343. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1188.
344. Id.
345. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, supra note 47, at 449.
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homestead interests, community property interests, and trusts, not just
separate individual rights.346  Additionally, the interests to which a
federal administrative levy cannot attach are enumerated in § 6334(a) of
the Code.347  Property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety is not listed as
exempt from the reach of § 6321.348 Furthermore, as viewed by the
House, the 1954 House bill was an attempt to "clarify" the existing law,
not to alter it.349 If amending § 6321 to explicitly list tenancy-by-the-
entirety property as property that could be attached by a federal tax lien
would have been excessive, then it can be argued that a federal tax lien
can already attach to such interests.
350
Additionally, the Constitution gives the United States government the
power to collect taxes, whereas state law governs private creditors.
351
Furthermore, the Court has noted that the power of the IRS to collect
taxes does not flow from being an ordinary creditor but from the
express language of the Code.352 It is the "exercise of a sovereign
prerogative. '" 353
346. Id.; see supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis of
the expansive reach of § 6321); see also supra notes 151-54 (discussing United States v.
Rodgers, where the Court held that a federal tax lien could attach to homestead property to satisfy
the debts of one spouse even though that spouse only had an undivided interest in the property).
347. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (listing the property which is exempt from a
federal tax lien). Section 6334(c) is "specific and . . . clear." United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S.
190, 204-05 (1971). "[Tlhere is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens
to be exempt from state levy under state laws." Id. at 205.
348. See supra note 46 (listing the property that is exempt from a federal tax lien).
Additionally, the Court has emphasized that the language of § 6334 is specific and clear,
intending not to recognize further exemptions. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 56 (1999);
Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 205; United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958).
349. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legislative history of § 6321).
350. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1185.
351. Id. at 1172-73; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I ("lay and collect taxes"); see also supra
note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the power to collect income taxes given to Congress
by the United States Constitution).
352. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 (1983).
[T]he Government's right to seek a forced sale of the entire property in which a
delinquent taxpayer had an interest does not arise out of its privileges as an ordinary
creditor, but out of the express terms of § 7403. Moreover, the use of the power
granted by § 7403 is not the act of an ordinary creditor, but the exercise of a sovereign
prerogative, incident to the power to enforce the obligations of the delinquent taxpayer
himself, and ultimately grounded in the constitutional mandate to "lay and collect
taxes."
Id. "The IRS is an involuntary creditor," who cannot choose the people with whom it does
business, "so it cannot be seen as having assumed the risk of nonpayment by dealing with them."
Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1172.
353. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 697.
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Therefore, the second prong of the test is satisfied.354 Under federal
law, a tax lien attaches to all property interests a debtor taxpayer may
have. 355  Federal law lists all the property exempt from a federal tax
lien, and tenancy-by-the-entirety property is not on this list.
356
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that state law exemptions
cannot shield property from a federal tax lien.357
D. Protection for the Non-Debtor Spouse
The dissent was incorrect when it argued that the majority's ruling
would not adequately protect the non-debtor spouse358 because there are
statutory protections in place that safeguard the non-debtor spouse's
interests. 359  For example, in order to enforce a lien, the federal
government generally must levy the property or have a judicial sale. 360
Often, judicial review and administrative hearings are required before a
levy is made. 36 1  Additionally, Congress has made certain types of
property exempt from administrative levy. 36 2 The IRS can also return
363property and release levies, if they were wrongfully applied. Finally,
a taxpayer who has been affected by a wrongful levy can obtain
damages or seek to undo the levy through a civil action. 364
However, the most practical way that the IRS could proceed to
recover unpaid taxes would be through a judicial sale of the property. 365
Section 7403 of the Code allows a federal court to sell the entire piece
of property and distribute the proceeds to the various owners of the
354. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 857.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 857 n.78.
358. See supra Parts III.D.2-3 (analyzing the dissenting arguments in Craft III); see also Craft
I11, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1426 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's ruling will
inadequately protect non-debtor spouses).
359. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 851. Johnson believes
that the real impact on non-debtor spouses is not when the lien attaches, but rather when the sale
of the property occurs. Id.
360. See supra Part II.B (discussing the means of enforcing a federal tax lien).
361. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1183 (discussing protections for non-debtor
spouses); see I.R.C. § 6330 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
362. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1183 (discussing protections for non-debtor
spouses); see I.R.C. § 6334(a)(13), (e) (2000). These provisions have reduced the IRS levies on
residences and businesses. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1163 n. 132. For three months
in 1998, the IRS made about 586,000 levies. Id. For the same period in 1999, the number
dropped by 570,000, to about 16,000 levies. Id.
363. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1183.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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property. 36 6  Thus, a non-debtor spouse would receive half of the
proceeds, and the .IRS would receive the other half, as in Craft.367
Furthermore, there are safeguards in place that allow a court to deny an
IRS petition to sell a piece of land.368 The courts are given discretion to
weigh the individual interests of the IRS and the hardship to the non-
debtor spouse.
369
In addition, in states where tenancy-by-the-entirety is not recognized,
property can still be held jointly.370 The federal tax lien has been
allowed to attach to jointly owned property, to the extent of the debtor
spouse's interest.371 Thus, the new policy created by Craft does not add
a new type of hardship to non-debtor spouses; it only places all non-
debtor spouses in the same position, no matter where the property is
owned. 372
V. IMPACT
Ultimately, Craft will reduce the manipulation and abuse of the tax
system as a whole and create more equity in the tax system.373  This
decision will help create uniformity in the application of federal tax
liens to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. 374  Furthermore, the
366. Id.; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing § 7403 and the judicial
sale of property).
367. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1183. If the debtor spouse pre-deceases the non-
debtor spouse, the non-debtor spouse would inherit the entire interest in the property. See supra
notes 106-11 (discussing the court's analysis of the survivorship interest in United States v. 2525
Leroy Lane).
368. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697-99 (1983); Johnson, After Drye, supra note
27, at 1183.
369. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1183. The statutory language of § 7403 of the
Code states that the court "may," after application from the IRS, direct the sale of the property.
Id.; I.R.C. § 7403. The use of the word "may" indicates that Congress wanted the courts to weigh
all of the interests involved before forcing a sale of the property. Johnson, After Drye, supra note
27, at 1183. If, for example, the hardship to the non-debtor spouse outweighs the revenue interest
of the IRS, the courts would deny the sale. Id.; see also Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal
Fisc, supra note 7, at 850-51 (explaining how the rule allowing a federal tax lien to attach to
tenancy-by-the-entirety property is fair to non-debtor spouses).
370. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1172.
371. Id.
372. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 850-51. Johnson notes
that it would only place non-debtor spouses who were protected by the tenancy-by-the-entirety
bar in the exact same position as the non-delinquent spouses living in states where there is no
such protection from the IRS. Id. "Parity with the rest of the nation cannot be considered undue
hardship." Id.
373. See infra Parts V.A-B (discussing an example of how the tax system could have been
manipulated and abused by married taxpayers).
374. See infra Part V.B (showing how the Craft decision will create uniformity in the states'
treatment of federal tax liens with respect to tenancy-by-the-entirety property).
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decision in Craft will reduce the uncertainty as to whether a federal tax
lien will attach to a particular form of property.
375
A. Possible Manipulation and Abuse of the System
If the court did not attach the federal tax lien to the property held in
tenancy-by-the-entirety, taxpayers would be able to manipulate and
abuse the system. 37 6 For example, spouses, like the Crafts in Michigan,
could transfer everything they owned into property held as tenants-by-
the-entirety and then file their tax returns separately. 377  The spouse
with the higher income, thus in the higher tax bracket, could then take
more aggressive positions on his or her return, like not reporting cash
income or taking questionable deductions, which would reduce his or
her taxes paid.378 Then, the spouse who was in a lower tax bracket
could accurately report his or her income and pay the amount of taxes
owed.3 7 9  Under the pre-Craft rule, it would not be worth the effort for
the IRS to bring suit against the higher-income spouse for the taxes
owed because the IRS could not collect against an individual spouse
from property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety.
380
B. Equity in the Tax System
Craft shows that state law barriers to federal tax collection have
essentially been dissolved.381 This result is correct because previously
state-recognized property interests like tenancy-by-the-entirety interests
made it impossible to enforce a tax lien in some jurisdictions, while in
375. See infra Part V.B (showing how the Craft decision will create equity in the tax system).
376. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1171; Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal
Fisc, supra note 7, at 848 ("The entireties bar compromises the government's ability to 'lay and
collect taxes.' ... This revenue concern is heightened by the fact that motivated taxpayers can
deliberately structure their affairs and manipulate the entireties bar to avoid paying tax."); see
also Craft 11, 140 F.3d 638, 649 (1998) (Ryan, J., concurring) (The entireties bar "not only
contravenes established recent precedent, but provides an avenue for easy avoidance of federal
income-tax laws."), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002).
377. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1171. Johnson gives this example as a way
taxpayers could abuse the tax system. Id. He further discusses how the protection given to
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety has created "audit insurance" for couples who want to
manipulate the tax system. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc, supra note 7, at 848-
50.
378. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1171.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Phillips, supra note 308, at 583. "[S]tate law characterization has been effectively
reduced to a somewhat moot consideration. While the courts may pay lip-service to the notion of
state law, that law will not be upheld in the collection of taxes if one of the incidents of that
property definition is non-severability." Id. at 584.
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other jurisdictions the lien attached to essentially the same property. 382
Furthermore, our tax system is designed so that taxpayers who have the
same amount of income and deductions pay the same amount of
taxes. 383 Under the previous rule, that a federal tax lien could not attach
to property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety, two people with the same
tax deficiency would have been treated differently depending on the
state in which they lived.384 If one person lived in a state that protected
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety, the property would not be
subject to a federal tax lien, whereas the other who lived in a state that
did not recognize tenancy-by-the-entirety would be subject to a tax
lien.385  Craft creates a rule whereby federal tax liens can attach to
property of all taxpayers who default against the government, not just
the property of debtors living in states that do not recognize tenancy-by-
the-entirety.
386
The holding in Craft significantly reduces the uncertainty regarding
how the Supreme Court will treat jointly owned property. The trend in
federal tax analysis in the recent decisions by the Court is evidence of a
disregard for state law definitions of property. 387 Such disregard was
necessary so that state laws, which define property rights, could not
block the uniform collection of taxes. 388
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly decided that a federal tax lien should attach to
property held in tenancy-by-the-entirety. The majority opinion
correctly applied the analysis in Drye to determine that there are rights
to property created in the state law definition of tenancy-by-the-entirety.
While this decision only affects the law in some states because not all
states allow tenancy-by-the-entirety property, it will nonetheless affect
how the federal tax lien will be applied in the future. Furthermore, this
382. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1172.
383. Id. at 1171-72. "Our tax system is 'designed to ensure as far as possible that similarly
situated taxpayers pay the same amount of tax.' This principle of horizontal equity is important
aspirationally and, despite various departures, often operationally in our tax system." Id. (quoting
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979)). "Each taxpayer should bear his
own tax responsibility." Phillips, supra note 308, at 590.
384. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1172; see also supra Part II.C.2 (analyzing the
different treatment of tenancy-by-the-entirety property across the United States).
385. Johnson, After Drye, supra note 27, at 1172.
386. Id.
387. Phillips, supra note 308, at 579.
388. Id. at 590.
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decision will create a more uniform application of the federal tax
lien.38
9
389. Craft, however, does not completely solve the problem. There still should be a uniform
property definition so that property owners and lawyers can anticipate whether a tax lien will
attach. Phillips, supra note 308, at 590. That issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
